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WE’RE ON A MISSION FROM GOD: 
PROPERLY INTERPRETING RLUIPA’S 
“EQUAL TERMS” PROVISION 
DANIEL MAZZELLA† 
INTRODUCTION 
About twenty-seven miles south of Chicago in Chicago 
Heights, in a dusty, rundown warehouse, with clutter all about, a 
small congregation settled in for Mass and began to pray.1  “Our 
Father who art in heaven, Hallowed be thy name; Thy kingdom 
come . . . ”2  But should such Kingdom ever come, it would find 
itself subject to myriad zoning regulations, which could put an 
end to the Kingdom before it even broke ground.3  That, at least, 
has been the experience of many of those assemblies and 
institutions awaiting the Kingdom’s arrival, including the River 
of Life Church meeting in that warehouse. 
The congregation of about thirty regular parishioners 
dreamed of having a real church instead of their current dingy 
warehouse.4  After some search, the church found a building in 
the village of Hazel Crest, a few miles south of Chicago Heights,  
 
 
 
 
† Senior Articles Editor, St. John’s Law Review; J.D., 2012, St. John’s University 
School of Law; B.B.A., Accounting, 2008, Adelphi University; Certified Public 
Accountant (C.P.A.). The author would like to thank Professor Marc O. DeGirolami 
for his help in parsing an especially dense area of law, and the author’s mother, who 
put up with being the test subject as he tried to find a way to make this subject 
understandable and readable. 
1 See River of Life Kingdom Ministries v. Vill. of Hazel Crest, 611 F.3d 367, 368 
(7th Cir. 2010). 
2 Matthew 6:9–10 (The Holy Bible Catholic Edition RSV). 
3 One can imagine an absurd situation in which God himself is denied a building 
permit by a planning board especially zealous about maintaining its zoning plan. 
However, the commencement of God’s Kingdom on Earth is likely to lead to a 
significant revision of current law that may obviate such bothers. 
4 River of Life, 611 F.3d at 368. 
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and purchased it.5  Their prayers appearing answered, they 
applied to the town for the necessary permits to operate a 
church.6 
Meanwhile, the Village of Hazel Crest, grappling with a 
depressed downtown and declining tax revenues, had passed a 
comprehensive revitalization plan.7  The plan called for the 
creation of a pure commercial district around the train station in 
the downtown area.8  From this area, all non-commercial land 
uses, including religious land uses, were barred, with the goal of 
creating a bustling commercial district that would generate 
substantial tax revenues.9  The church’s property fell squarely 
within this area.10 
As the Village’s plan expressly disallowed religious land uses 
in the zone, the congregation’s application was summarily 
denied.11  Soon thereafter, the congregation filed suit in federal 
court, invoking the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized 
Persons Act of 2000,12 to reverse the village’s zoning decision.13 
Thus, River of Life v. Village of Hazel Crest began, providing 
another example of the tension that often exists between zoning 
authorities and religious persons and organizations.  Tensions 
and emotions often run high where the local regulations restrict 
the ability of religious organizations to site where they wish and 
to worship as their religions dictate.14  The Bible says “[r]ender 
 
5 See id. 
6 River of Life Kingdom Ministries v. Vill. of Hazel Crest, No. 08C0950, 2008 
WL 4865568, at *2 (N.D. Ill. July 14, 2008), aff’d, 611 F.3d 367 (7th Cir.2010). 
7 See River of Life, 611 F.3d at 368. 
8 Id. 
9 Id. 
10 River of Life, 2008 WL 4865568, at *2. 
11 See id. 
12 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc (2006). 
13 See River of Life, 2008 WL 4865568, at *2. 
14 For lurid accounts of such battles, see MARCI A. HAMILTON, GOD VS. THE 
GAVEL: RELIGION AND THE RULE OF LAW, 78–110 (2005). However, the book has 
been the subject of a good deal of controversy, including an intense back and forth 
between professor Douglas Laycock and the author, as to the book’s factual accuracy 
and the merits of policies advocated, with some claiming those policies to merely be 
fronts for the author’s personal disillusionment with organized religion generally. 
See generally Douglas Laycock, A Syllabus of Errors, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1169 (2007); 
Marci A. Hamilton, A Response to Professor Laycock, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1189 (2007); 
Douglas Laycock, God vs. The Gavel: A Brief Rejoinder, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1545 
(2007); Marc O. DeGirolami, Recoiling from Religion, 43 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 619 
(2006). 
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therefore to Caesar the things that are Caesar’s,”15 but where 
Caesar prevents religious organizations from functioning and 
worshipping as they must, the implicit understanding of mutual 
deference embodied in that Bible verse is violated.  Additionally, 
the First Amendment’s command against laws prohibiting the 
free exercise of religion is often violated.16 
Beginning in 1993, in the wake of Employment Division, 
Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith,17 these 
formerly local disputes became matters of federal import.  Smith 
held that the free exercise clause did not preclude the 
enforcement of “generally applicable laws” on religious activities, 
even where such laws burdened religious exercise.18  Smith’s 
holding outraged religious and civil rights organizations alike, 
who believed that the constitutional protections for religion had 
been reduced to a dangerous minimum.19  Congress, likewise 
outraged, sought to overturn Smith by statute.20 
The Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 
2000 (“RLUIPA”) is Congress’21 latest attempt to overturn 
Smith.22  Congress’ prior attempt to do so with the Religious 
 
15 Matthew 22:21. 
16 “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or 
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the 
press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the 
Government for a redress of grievances.” U.S. CONST. amend. I (emphasis added). 
See generally Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963). 
17 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
18 Id. at 878. 
19 See HAMILTON, supra note 14, at 223–26. 
20 See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 512–16 (1997) (“Congress enacted 
RFRA in direct response to the Court’s decision in [Smith].”). 
21 The reader may have noticed the omission of the “s” after the possessive 
“Congress’.” There presently exists a split of authority as to this matter among the 
many institutions concerned with the rules of the English language, such as the 
Associated Press. See Debra Cassens Weiss, The Supreme Court is Split on 
Apostrophes, ABA JOURNAL (Sept. 2, 2010, 9:45 AM), http://www.abajournal.com/ 
news/article/the_supreme_court_is_split_on_apostrophes. However, the Supreme 
Court has ruled, and rules every time it releases an opinion, that “Congress’ ” is 
proper. See, e.g., City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 511 (using “Congress’ ”exclusively). 
Though arguably dicta, as no case has ever required the resolution of this issue, the 
repeated use of “Congress’ ” in majority opinions is compelling. Furthermore, the 
split on the Court, formerly five-to-four, has in recent months expanded to six-to-
three. See id. at 541 (Scalia, J., concurring) (using “Congress’s” exclusively in his 
concurrence); Weiss, supra. Thus, the author intends to follow the binding precedent 
of the Supreme Court and will not append clearly unnecessary s’s to his “Congress’.” 
22 See HAMILTON, supra note 14, at 95. 
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Freedom Restoration Act (“RFRA”) had proven to be 
unconstitutional,23 thus Congress, hoping to cure any 
constitutional problems, wrote RLUIPA to be narrower in scope.  
Unlike RFRA, RLUIPA sought only, in relevant part,24 to end 
discrimination against religious organizations in land use 
decisions.25  A key component of RLUIPA is the “equal terms” 
provision which provides “[n]o government shall impose or 
implement a land use regulation in a manner that treats a 
religious assembly or institution on less than equal terms with a 
nonreligious assembly or institution.”26 
Though phrased simply, the “equal terms” provision has 
caused great interpretive problems.  The statute, while “[having] 
the ‘feel’ of an equal protection law,” lacks a similarly situated 
comparator.27  The statute, therefore, leads one to wonder: equal 
terms compared to what?  The statute further fails to define 
“assembly” and “institution,” thus raising the further question:  
What is included in “assembly” and “institution”? 
To date, three federal circuit courts of appeals have dealt 
with facial challenges28 to zoning ordinances under the provision 
and have developed three different tests for its application.29  The 
 
23 See Boerne, 521 U.S. at 536. 
24 As the statute’s name suggests, there are two halves to the statute. The 
“institutionalized persons” half, which is beyond the scope of this Note, concerns 
issues of free exercise in the context of prisons and other institutions, and has been 
the subject of Supreme Court litigation. See Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 713–
14 (2005) (upholding the act as constitutional under the Establishment Clause). 
25 See Midrash Sephardi, Inc. v. Town of Surfside, 366 F.3d 1214, 1226 (11th 
Cir. 2004). 
26 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(b)(1) (2006). 
27 Midrash Sephardi, 366 F.3d at 1229. 
28 In this context, the plaintiffs assert that the terms of challenged zoning 
ordinance on their face violate “equal terms.” This is in contrast to an as-applied 
challenge where the plaintiff makes no argument as to the ordinance’s terms, but 
only to the specific instance of its application. This Note is concerned solely with 
facial challenges. 
29 Two other circuits, the Tenth and the Second, have also been presented with 
the “equal terms” provision of RLUIPA, but under different circumstances. The 
Tenth Circuit case, Rocky Mountain Christian Church v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, was 
an appeal from a jury verdict in favor of the religious plaintiff’s as-applied challenge 
to the zoning statute. 613 F.3d 1229, 1233, 1237 (10th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. 
Ct. 978 (2011). The Second Circuit case, Third Church of Christ, Scientist, of New 
York City v. City of New York, likewise concerned an as-applied challenge to the 
zoning ordinance. See 626 F.3d 667, 668–69 (2d Cir. 2010). The Eleventh Circuit has 
also dealt with as-applied “equal terms” challenges on two occasions. See Primera 
Iglesia Bautista Hispana of Boca Raton, Inc. v. Broward County, 450 F.3d 1295, 
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Eleventh Circuit, in Midrash Sephardi, Inc. v. Town of 
Surfside,30 held that the statute’s language included all 
assemblies, with assembly retaining its basic definition of “a 
group gathered for a common purpose.”31  Thus, the court held 
that if a broadly defined secular assembly is allowed in a zone, a 
religious assembly must likewise be allowed, lest the statute be 
violated.32  Upon finding a violation, the regulation must then 
survive strict scrutiny: the government must proffer a compelling 
state interest for the inequality and demonstrate that the means 
adopted were the narrowest possible.33 
Unlike the Eleventh Circuit, the Third Circuit judicially 
added a similarly situated requirement not otherwise found in 
the statute’s text.34  In Lighthouse Institute for Evangelism, Inc. 
v. City of Long Branch,35 the court stated that the religious 
plaintiff must not be treated on less than equal terms than a 
secular assembly similarly situated as to the challenged 
regulation’s “regulatory purpose.”36  That is, the court looks for 
“internal consistency” within the land use ordinance that all land 
uses having similar effects upon the ordinance’s purpose are 
treated in equal fashion.37  For example, a land use ordinance 
seeking to increase tax revenues would have to prohibit not just 
religious land uses but all other land uses tending to generate 
negligible tax revenue to not run afoul of the “equal terms” 
provision.38  Additionally, once a violation is found, the 
municipality is held strictly liable for the violation.39 
 
 
 
1302 (11th Cir. 2006); Konikov v. Orange County, Fla., 410 F.3d 1317, 1322 (11th 
Cir. 2005). This Note deals only with facial challenges to zoning ordinances under 
the “equal terms” provision. As such, the as-applied challenges of these other cases 
are beyond the scope of this Note. 
30 366 F.3d 1214 (11th Cir. 2004). 
31 Id. at 1231. 
32 See id. 
33 Id. at 1232. 
34 Lighthouse Inst. for Evangelism, Inc. v. City of Long Branch, 510 F.3d 253, 
264, 266–67 (3d Cir. 2007). 
35 510 F.3d 253 (3d Cir. 2007). 
36 Id. at 264 (emphasis added). 
37 See id. at 272. 
38 See infra Part II.D. 
39 Lighthouse, 510 F.3d at 269. 
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Finally, the Seventh Circuit also judicially added a similarly 
situated requirement, but declined to follow the Third Circuit’s 
lead.40  Believing the “regulatory purpose” to be far too subjective, 
the Seventh Circuit instead held that the religious plaintiff must 
be treated on less than equal terms than a secular assembly 
similarly situated as to “accepted zoning criteria.”41  Thus, for 
example, a theater and a church would be similar as to the 
zoning criteria of “traffic” as both land-uses tend towards 
concentrated comings and goings of persons, either at the end of 
a show or at the end of a religious service.42  However, like the 
Third Circuit, should a violation be found, the municipality is 
held strictly liable.43 
The three-way circuit split is by itself a problem begging for 
resolution by the Supreme Court, but exacerbating the problem 
is the potential for serious constitutional issues depending on the 
interpretation adopted.  As the Third and Seventh Circuits have 
noted, the Eleventh Circuit’s interpretation, and the statute 
itself, taken to their natural extreme create an affirmative right 
for religious organizations to avoid generally applicable 
regulations.44  Given such liberal definitions, nearly anything is 
either an assembly or an institution.  Such a result goes beyond 
Congress’ enforcement powers as defined in section five of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.45  As the Court explained in City of 
Boerne v. Flores, section five gives Congress the power to enact 
remedial legislation to correct and prevent abuses, but does not 
allow Congress the power to substantively alter or add rights.46  
The Eleventh Circuit’s interpretation arguably commits that very 
sin.47 
 
 
40 River of Life Kingdom Ministries v. Vill. of Hazel Crest, 611 F.3d 367, 371 
(7th Cir. 2010). 
41 See id.  
42 Id. at 373. 
43 See id. at 373–74. 
44 See id. at 371 (“If a church and a community center, though different in many 
respects, do not differ with respect to any accepted zoning criterion, then an 
ordinance that allows one and forbids the other denies equality and violates the 
equal-terms provision.”); Lighthouse, 510 F.3d at 268 & nn.12–13. 
45 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5. 
46 City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 518–19 (1997). 
47 See River of Life, 611 F.3d at 371. 
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On the other hand, while the Third and Seventh Circuits 
avoid the constitutional problems of the Eleventh Circuit, it is an 
open question as to whether their interpretations are 
contravening Congress’ intent.48  The statute’s text, even without 
resort to legislative history, makes clear that Congress intended 
to give religious plaintiffs a new tool with which to advance their 
interests.49  The interpretations of the Third and Seventh Circuit 
make it significantly more difficult for religious plaintiffs to 
maintain their claims, and may be entirely too friendly to 
municipal defendants by structuring the inquiry solely in the 
municipality’s terms—either the municipality’s “regulatory 
purpose” or the “accepted zoning criteria” used by the 
municipality.50  Additionally, the “similarly situated” 
requirement added by both circuits is without basis in the text of 
the statute.51  Thus, in an effort to avoid the evils of 
unconstitutionality, these courts appear to have chosen to risk 
the perceived lesser evil of contravening Congress’ intent. 
This Note argues that the interpretations given to the “equal 
terms” provision thus far are incorrect, and that a better 
approach is to compare secular and religious assemblies and 
institutions on the basis of their purposes.  Part One of this Note 
provides the background to RLUIPA from Sherbert to the Act’s 
enactment.  In Part Two, Midrash, Lighthouse, and River of Life 
are presented in chronological order and each circuit’s test is 
analyzed.  In Part Three, the provision’s plain text and its 
placement in the larger statutory scheme are analyzed in 
accordance with standard canons of construction.  The current 
circuit approaches are then critiqued.  Finally, a solution to the 
current circuit split based on the proposed test of the Seventh 
Circuit’s dissenter is presented, which provides the best balance 
between effecting Congress’ intent and preserving the statute’s 
constitutionality. 
 
 
48 See Lighthouse, 510 F.3d at 287–88 (Jordan, J., dissenting). 
49 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc (2006) (providing four separate statutory provisions for 
religious plaintiffs to base claims upon). 
50 See River of Life, 611 F.3d at 385–86 (Sykes, J., dissenting). 
51 See id. at 385 (“Tellingly, the Lighthouse Institute majority did not try to 
make an argument for its interpretation from the text and structure of the statute.”). 
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Solving the current circuit split and developing a solid test 
has become more urgent in light of the recent economic 
downturn.  As state and local governments come under 
increasing stress from falling tax revenues, they will resort to 
new and creative ways to raise funds, including changing zoning 
schemes to favor tax producing land uses over tax exempt land 
uses, of which religious land uses are prime exemplars.  This 
danger is made clear by the fact that in Midrash, Lighthouse, 
and River of Life, the challenged zoning regulations were enacted 
specifically to revitalize depressed or underdeveloped zones to 
increase tax revenues.52 
I. THE COMPELLING (BUT NEUTRAL) RECENT HISTORY OF THE 
FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE 
Section A of this Part discusses the rise and fall of Sherbert 
v. Verner,53 and its replacement by Employment Division, 
Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith54 as the key 
case in free exercise jurisprudence.  Also discussed is the case of 
Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah55 and 
its impact on modern free exercise jurisprudence.  Section B 
deals with the initial congressional response to the Supreme 
Court’s holding in Smith, and the Court’s disposition of the 
resultant legislation in City of Boerne v. Flores.56  In Section C, 
the genesis of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized 
Persons Act of 2000 (“RLUIPA”),57 Congress’ second attempt to 
work around Smith, is presented.  The concluding Section, D, 
provides a brief summary of where the law stood immediately 
following RLUIPA’s passage. 
 
 
52 See id. at 368; Lighthouse, 510 F.3d at 258; Midrash Sephardi, Inc. v. Town of 
Surfside, 366 F.3d 1214, 1221–22 (11th Cir. 2004). 
53 374 U.S. 398 (1963). 
54 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
55 508 U.S. 520 (1993). 
56 521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
57 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc (2006). 
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A.  The Fall of Sherbert and the Rise of Smith 
Sherbert v. Verner, from its inception in 1963, was the key 
case in free exercise jurisprudence.58  The rule announced was 
that government regulations that substantially burden a person’s 
free exercise of religion are subject to strict scrutiny.59  That is, 
the government would have to show that the challenged 
regulation served a compelling state interest, and demonstrate 
that the means adopted are the narrowest possible, inflicting the 
smallest burden possible.60 
In Sherbert, the plaintiff, a Seventh Day Adventist,61 was 
denied unemployment benefits by the South Carolina 
Employment Security Commission following her refusal to work 
on Saturdays, her Sabbath day.62  Though the commission was 
empowered to make individualized exceptions for good cause, the 
commission held that religious conviction was not good cause.63  
Justice Brennan, writing for the majority, stated that this denial 
amounted to penalizing plaintiff for practicing her religion, 
thereby substantially burdening her right to free exercise.64  The 
Court further held that South Carolina’s interest in preserving 
the financial solidity of the state unemployment fund was not a  
 
 
 
 
58 See 1 KENT GREENAWALT, RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION: FREE EXERCISE 
AND FAIRNESS 236 (2009). 
59 See id. 
60 See id. 
61 Though differences exist, in the main Seventh Day Adventists follow  
the traditional beliefs of conservative Christianity. See The Seventh  
Day Adventist Church: Its Beliefs and Practices, RELIGIOUSTOLERANCE.ORG, 
http://www.religioustolerance.org/sda2.htm (last updated Nov. 10, 2009). The most 
obvious difference is the Adventist practice of observing the Sabbath on Saturday 
instead of Sunday—the practice at issue in Sherbert. See id. Doctrinally, a key 
difference is the rejection of the notion of “innate immortality.” See id. Far from 
believing that each person is immortal by way of the soul as commonly believed by 
most other Christian denominations, Adventists believe that upon death a person 
enters an unconscious state only to be “reawakened” on judgment day, at which 
point the person will either be granted eternal life or be permanently destroyed. See 
id. Also integral is the belief in Christ’s imminent return and the attendant 
occurrence of a Rapture event. See id. 
62 Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 399–401 (1963). 
63 Id. at 400–01. 
64 Id. at 404. 
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compelling interest sufficient to justify the substantial burden 
imposed.65  Thus, the employment commission could not 
constitutionally deny plaintiff unemployment benefits.66 
Over the next two decades, the Court would periodically 
revisit Sherbert and extend its logic to new areas.  One such case 
was Wisconsin v. Yoder,67 decided in 1972.  There, a Wisconsin 
statute required all children to attend school until the age of 
sixteen; the parents of the child to be held criminally liable 
should the child not so attend.68  A group of Amish parents, 
pursuant to their Mennonite beliefs, refused to allow their 
children to attend compulsory education beyond the eighth 
grade.69  The parents of the children were convicted and fined for 
violating the statute.70  A unanimous Court71 held that, as in 
Sherbert, the challenged regulation effectively prevented the 
faithful from exercising their religion by penalizing them with 
criminal sanction for following those beliefs.72 
However, in 1988,73 as if to foreshadow what was to come, 
the Supreme Court expressly declined to either extend or apply 
the Sherbert rule in deciding Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery 
Protective Ass’n.74  The federal Forest Service intended to 
construct a seventy-five mile paved road connecting two 
 
65 See id. 406–08. 
66 Id. at 410. 
67 406 U.S. 205 (1972). 
68 Id. at 207–08 & n.2. 
69 Id. at 207–08. 
70 Id. at 208. 
71 Justices Rehnquist and Powell took no part in the consideration of this case. 
See id. at 236. Justice Douglas filed a partial dissent. He concurred in the result as 
to the Yoders, but would have remanded the case of the others for further 
proceedings to determine the wishes of the children. See id. at 243–46 (Douglas, J., 
dissenting). The decision, he explained, was more complex than simply balancing the 
state’s interest in compulsory education against the parent’s right to raise and rear 
his child. See id. at 241. Rather, the child is a distinct and vitally important third 
party whose preference and decision, provided the child is mature enough, may be 
dispositive in this context. See id. at 242. He emphasized that education in the 
modern world is so vitally important that any decision as to its continuation or 
cessation can easily determine the entire path of the child’s life and foreclose or 
make available to him or her innumerable opportunities. Therefore, the child’s voice 
ought to be heard. See id. at 244–46. 
72 See id. at 218 (majority opinion). 
73 Also decided in 1988 was Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith 
(Smith I), 485 U.S. 660 (1988), the lesser known and less controversial first iteration 
of the landmark case. 
74 485 U.S. 439, 452 (1988). 
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California towns.75  Work had been completed on either side of 
the seventy-five mile span such that all that remained to be 
completed was a six-mile span through the Chimney Rock 
national forest to connect the two halves of the road.76  Several 
local Native American tribes objected to the proposed 
construction of the road through the area alleging that the road 
would result in irreparable harm to their centuries-old religious 
practices in the area.77  The endangered practices required 
complete immersion in nature with no man-made interference.78  
The road, they argued, would make such immersion impossible.79 
In rejecting their claim, Justice O’Connor wrote that the 
Free Exercise clause does not require the bending of government 
action to every religious practice.80  If the free exercise clause 
required such a result, it would become very difficult for the 
government to craft and implement any of its policies.81  Indeed, 
as the Court emphasized, in this case the Federal government 
owned the land outright and was exercising its right to build 
thereupon.82  Furthermore, the petitioner’s position, if adopted, 
would “require de facto beneficial ownership of some rather 
spacious tracts of public property” for these tribes and would 
effectively federally subsidize their religious beliefs, something 
implicating potential Establishment Clause issues.83 
Where Lyng had merely declined to extend Sherbert, 
Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of 
Oregon v. Smith,84 decided in 1990, affirmatively cut back the 
reach of Sherbert so far as to effectively render it largely 
toothless.85  The Oregon state ordinance in question required the 
denial of unemployment benefits if the applicant had been 
dismissed for “misconduct,” which often included illicit drug 
 
75 Id. at 442. 
76 Id. 
77 Id. at 451. 
78 Id. at 453. 
79 Id. at 451. 
80 See id. 
81 Id. at 452. 
82 Id. at 453. 
83 Id. 
84 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
85 See id. at 884 (“Even if we were inclined to breathe into Sherbert some life 
beyond the unemployment compensation field”). 
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use.86  Should “misconduct” be found, benefits would be denied, 
no exceptions.87  Plaintiffs, two Native Americans, were fired 
from their jobs at a private drug rehabilitation organization after 
ingesting peyote at a religious ceremony,88 and were 
subsequently denied unemployment benefits under the Oregon 
law.89  In a situation that bore a remarkable outward similarity 
to the facts of Sherbert, the plaintiffs alleged that the law coerced 
them from freely exercising their religion by penalizing them for 
acting in accordance with their religion.90 
The Court held the tenets of an individual’s religion are no 
escape from the command of generally applicable laws.91  Justice 
Scalia, writing for the majority, stated, “[t]he government’s 
ability to enforce generally applicable prohibitions of socially 
harmful conduct, like its ability to carry out other aspects of 
public policy, ‘cannot depend on measuring the effects of a 
governmental action on a religious objector’s spiritual 
development.’ ”92  The rule petitioners sought, he warned, “would 
open the prospect of constitutionally required religious 
exemptions from civic obligations of almost every conceivable 
kind.”93  Where in other areas, such as race, the application of 
strict scrutiny produces equality, here its application would 
create “a private right to ignore generally applicable laws—[a] 
constitutional anomaly.”94 
Sherbert and its progeny were distinguished in two ways.  
First, Sherbert itself was distinguished by noting  
that the employment insurance system there involved 
 
86 Id. at 874–75.  
87 Id. at 874–76. 
88 “[A] hallucinogen derived from the plant Lophophora williamsii Lemaire.” Id. 
at 874. 
89 Id.  
90 See id. at 875–76. 
91 Id. at 885. 
92 Id. (quoting Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439, 451 
(1988)). 
93 Id. at 888 (citing Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 450 (1971)). 
Interestingly, the district court decision of Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. 
Hialeah is cited by the Court in this part of the opinion, apparently approving of the 
district court’s decision to enforce “animal cruelty laws” against the church plaintiff. 
Id. at 889 (citing Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 723 F. 
Supp. 1467, 1476 (S.D. Fla.1989)). Within three years, this seeming approval turned 
to unanimous disapproval. See infra notes 105–13 and accompanying text. 
94 Employment Division, 494 U.S. at 886. 
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“individualized . . . assessment[s].”95  That system “lent itself  
to [the] individualized government[] assessment of the reasons 
for the relevant conduct.”96  Consequently, a government  
could not deny unemployment benefits in cases of religious 
hardship without a compelling reason for doing so.97  The law in 
Sherbert, therefore, was not “generally applicable.”  Furthermore, 
the Court stated that the Sherbert test had never been 
successfully applied in any context other than the narrow  
category of unemployment insurance programs involving 
“individualized . . . assessment[s].”98  By contrast, the 
Washington state law challenged in Smith was neutral and 
generally applicable:  The statute was a categorical denial of 
benefits upon violation, with no individualized assessment of the 
motivating reasons for the relevant conduct.99 
Second, cases such as Yoder coupled other fundamental 
rights claims with the free exercise claim.100  For example, in 
Yoder, the Court explained that the free exercise claim was 
intertwined with the fundamental right of parents to direct the 
education of their children as understood in Pierce v. Society of 
Sisters.101  Therefore, the progeny of Sherbert that ostensibly 
extended its reach did anything but.  Rather, the progeny of 
 
95 Id. at 884. 
96 Id. 
97 Id. 
98 See id. 
99 See id. 
100 See id. at 882 n.1. 
101 Id. (citing Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus and Mary, 268 
U.S. 510, 532 (1925)). Pierce concerned an Oregon statute that required school age 
children to attend a state run public school in lieu of any other private school. See 
Pierce, 268 U.S. at 530–31. Should the child not attend a public school, the parents 
would be guilty of a misdemeanor. Id. at 530. The law effectively made private 
schools largely non-viable. Id. at 532. A Roman Catholic school and a secular school 
challenged the statute. See id. at 531–33. The Court unanimously held: 
[The law] interferes with the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the 
upbringing and education of children under their control. . . . The 
fundamental theory of liberty upon which all governments in this Union 
repose excludes any general power of the state to standardize its children 
by forcing them to accept instruction from public teachers only. The child is 
not the mere creature of the state; those who nurture him and direct his 
destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and 
prepare him for additional obligations. 
Id. at 534–35. 
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Sherbert were decided on non-free exercise grounds.102  
Consequently, the claim in Smith being unconnected to any other 
asserted right, could not stand on Sherbert alone.103 
Many feared the rule announced in Smith had removed 
many of the protections enjoyed by religion and would lead to 
wide scale governmental interference with religion under the 
guise of “generally applicable” laws.104  However, in 1993, the 
Court at least partially countered those fears by striking down an 
allegedly neutral law of general applicability in Church of the 
Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah.105  The city of 
Hialeah, Florida, upon hearing that practitioners of the Santeria 
religion106 intended to establish a church within the city limits, 
convened several meetings of the town council.107  At these 
meetings, the council passed several new ordinances prohibiting 
the slaughter of animals for purposes other than food 
consumption on the pretexts of preventing cruelty against 
animals and protecting public health and safety.108  The 
ordinances, however, were structured in such a way that no 
person or organization other than a Santeria church could be 
affected.109 
 
102 Employment Division, 494 U.S. at 881–82. 
103 See id. at 882. 
104 See HAMILTON, supra note 14, at 225–26. See also Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a)(2) (2006) (“laws ‘neutral’ toward religion may 
burden religious exercise as surely as laws intended to interfere with religious 
exercise.”). 
105 508 U.S. 520, 547 (1993). 
106 Santeria, a fusion of traditional West African religions and Catholicism, 
developed in the Caribbean, principally on the island of Cuba. See id. at 524. Central 
to the religion is the belief in Orishas: powerful spirits who aid the faithful in 
achieving their destinies. Id. The Orishas are not, however, immortal and require 
periodic ritualistic animal sacrifice to survive. Id. at 525. Animal sacrifice, thus, is 
crucial to the exercise of the Santeria faith. Common sacrificial animals include 
various birds (particularly chickens), goats, sheep and turtles. Id. Historically, 
practitioners of Santeria faced widespread persecution, and, as a consequence, 
largely practiced in secret. Id. To this day Santeria remains secretive and is seldom 
practiced openly. Id. 
107 Id. at 526. 
108 Id. at 527–28, 544. 
109 For example, one ordinance outlawed the sacrifice of animals in any private 
or public ritual for purposes other than food consumption. Id. at 527. A second 
ordinance then restricted the application of the first ordinance to groups that 
slaughter or sacrifice animals for any purpose as part of a ritual. Id. The net effect of 
this formulation was to outlaw Santeria animal sacrifice while providing an escape 
for other slaughterers of animals. In particular, under this formulation, kosher 
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The Supreme Court held that while the ordinances on their 
face were neutral and generally applicable, the statutes actually 
had the suppression of Santeria as their object.110  The 
ordinances had effectively been gerrymandered in such a way as 
to ensure only Santeria would be adversely impacted.111  Thus, 
the law was neither neutral nor generally applicable, and 
therefore subject to strict scrutiny.112  The proffered government 
interests of preventing cruelty to animals and protecting the 
public health were neither sufficient to sustain these ordinances, 
nor were they credible in light of the gerrymandered nature of 
the ordinances that made the ordinances both under and over 
inclusive.113  Hence, the Court held that where a law, albeit 
outwardly generally applicable and neutral, operates to affect 
religion specifically to the exclusion of other functionally 
equivalent activities that produce similar effects, the free 
exercise clause is offended and the challenged law must undergo 
strict scrutiny.114 
 
animal slaughter for food consumption was exempted, despite being pursuant to a 
ritual. Id. at 536. Kosher slaughter was further exempted from the ordinances’ 
incorporation by reference of other exemptions under state law, one of which was an 
express exemption for kosher slaughter. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. 
v. City of Hialeah, 723 F. Supp. 1467, 1480 (S.D. Fla. 1989). 
110 Hialeah, 508 U.S. at 534. 
111 Id. at 536. 
112 Id. at 546. 
113 Id. at 545. 
114 Id. at 545–46. There are essentially two variants of this holding, neither of 
which carried a majority of the Court. The first variant found in Justice Kennedy’s 
opinion searches for, and emphasizes the finding of an impermissible motive for the 
challenged ordinances to render them non-neutral and subject to strict scrutiny. See 
id. at 540. The second variant proposed by Justice Scalia in his concurrence would 
ignore the underlying motive of the challenged ordinance and look solely to the 
ordinance’s effects to determine both neutrality and general applicability. Id. at 558–
59 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“Had the Hialeah City Council set out resolutely to 
suppress the practices of Santeria, but ineptly adopted ordinances that failed to do 
so, I do not see how those laws could be said to ‘prohibi[t] the free exercise’ of 
religion.”). The most reasonable assumption is that both variations are valid, and 
either the finding of an impermissible motive or gerrymandered effects would result 
in strict scrutiny for the challenged law. In the general case, the two conditions are 
almost certain to accompany each other. However, in the rare case where an evil 
motive is present without accompanying negative effects—that is, Justice Scalia’s 
inept municipality—one must wonder what plaintiff would have an injury under the 
ordinance conferring standing to sue in the first place. 
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B.  Congress Gets Religion 
Notwithstanding its decision in Lukumi, the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Smith caused great bipartisan concern that 
the constitutional protections afforded to religious exercise by 
Sherbert had been destroyed.115  Congress was concerned that a 
neutral and generally applicable law could burden religious 
exercise just as surely as a law targeting religion.116  Thus, 
Congress believed, the test most sensible and workable was the 
Sherbert test applied by the Federal courts over the prior four 
decades117—ignoring the Court’s assertion in Smith that the 
Sherbert test had never been very active.118 
To restore the pre-Smith balance, Congress enacted the 
Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (“RFRA”) with 
unanimous bipartisan support.119  The Act operated to restore  
the Sherbert compelling interest test in all spheres to address 
asserted widespread discrimination against religion.120  
Furthermore, Congress, using its enforcement powers pursuant 
to section five of the Fourteenth Amendment, applied the RFRA 
to all governments—federal, state, and local.121 
However, Congress’ attempt to reverse Smith was rebuffed 
by the Court four short years later in City of Boerne v. Flores.122  
Bishop Flores of Boerne, Texas invoked the statute in an effort to 
expand his growing church.123  He asserted that local landmark 
ordinances impermissibly burdened his, and his congregation’s, 
free exercise rights by preventing an expansion of the church.124   
 
 
 
 
 
115 See HAMILTON, supra note 14, at 225–26. 
116 Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a)(2) (2006) 
(“laws ‘neutral’ toward religion may burden religious exercise as surely as laws 
intended to interfere with religious exercise”). 
117 Id. § 2000bb(a)(5). 
118 See Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 883 
(1990). 
119 See HAMILTON supra at note 14, 225. 
120 City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 515–16 (1997). 
121 Id. 
122 521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
123 See id. at 512. 
124 Id. 
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Far from backing down in the face of unanimous congressional 
action, the Court declared the statute’s application to state and 
local governments unconstitutional and reaffirmed Smith.125 
First, the Court stated that the power granted unto Congress 
by section five of the Fourteenth Amendment, far from being 
substantive or plenary, is remedial.126  That is, Congress has the 
power to correct and prevent constitutional violations by the 
states and enforce those violated constitutional rights by 
appropriate legislation.127  Congress does not, however, have the 
power to decree or alter substantive rights and then enforce such 
rights by appropriate legislation.128  Rather, Congress’ power is 
circumscribed by the text of the Constitution and the 
interpretation thereof by the Supreme Court.129  The Court, not 
Congress, has “[t]he power to interpret the Constitution in a case 
or controversy.”130  Were it any other way, the Court continued, 
“Congress could define its own powers by altering the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s meaning,” thereby causing the Constitution to 
become an ordinary law, changeable by ordinary means.131 
The Court held that for a law to be a valid use of Congress’ 
remedial section five powers, the law must be congruent and 
proportional to the asserted evil.132  To be congruent and 
proportional, the law “should be adapted to the mischief and 
wrong which the [Fourteenth] [A]mendment was intended to 
provide against.”133  Here, the congressional record, the Court 
noted, was devoid of any examples of active religious 
discrimination within the last forty years.134  Thus, enactment of 
a law so broad and powerful was out of all proportion and 
congruence considering the lack of evidence of actual serious, 
 
125 See id. at 536. Though unconstitutional as applied to the states, RFRA 
remains wholly constitutional and applicable against the federal government. See 
Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente União do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 439 
(2006). 
126 City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 519. 
127 See id. 
128 See id. 
129 See id. at 524. 
130 Id. 
131 Id. at 529. 
132 Id. at 520. 
133 Id. at 532 (quoting United States v. Stanley (The Civil Rights Cases), 109 
U.S. 3, 13 (1883)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
134 Id. at 530. 
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widespread mischief.135  The means adopted, moreover, had the 
effect of rendering void vast numbers of otherwise valid generally 
applicable and neutral laws—laws the Court had held in Smith 
were perfectly valid.136  Hence, the Act had exceeded Congress’ 
section five powers, and was therefore inapplicable to the 
states.137 
C.  Congress Tries Again 
Congress, having received the Court’s admonition138 in 
Boerne, prepared for the next round in this First Amendment 
ping-pong match.  The lessons Congress learned from Boerne 
were that (1) a record of widespread discrimination must be 
established before a remedial statute can stand, and (2) the 
statute must be written more narrowly.139 
Senators Orrin Hatch of Utah and Edward Kennedy  
of Massachusetts led extensive senatorial hearings on  
land-use discrimination against religious organizations.140  The 
congressional record compiled contained extensive testimony 
attesting to discrimination, numerous anecdotes of 
discrimination, and numerous statistical analyses evincing 
discrimination.141  Senators Hatch and Kennedy, on the basis of 
 
135 See id. at 531–32. However, the Court noted that even with a substantial 
record, RFRA could not “be considered remedial, preventive legislation, if those 
terms are to have any meaning. RFRA is so out of proportion to a supposed remedial 
or preventive object that it cannot be understood as responsive to, or designed to 
prevent, unconstitutional behavior.” Id. at 532. 
136 Id. at 534–35. 
137 Id. at 536. Justice Stevens in his concurrence would have invalidated the 
statute as a violation of the Establishment Clause. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring). He 
wrote that the legal weapon given to religious organizations by the statute was 
governmental preference for religion as opposed to irreligion, thus constituting an 
establishment of religion in general. See id. at 537 (“[T]he statute has provided the 
Church with a legal weapon that no atheist or agnostic can obtain. This 
governmental preference for religion, as opposed to irreligion, is forbidden by the 
[Establishment Clause of the First Amendment].”). 
138 “Admonition, n. Gentle reproof, as with a meat-axe. Friendly warning.” 
AMBROSE BIERCE, THE UNABRIDGED DEVIL’S DICTIONARY 12 (David E. Schultz & 
S.T. Joshi eds., 2000). 
139 See City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 530–532. 
140 See 146 CONG. REC. S7774 (daily ed. July 27, 2000) (joint statement of Sen. 
Hatch and Sen. Kennedy). 
141 Id. at S7775 (“[T]he hearing record reveals a widespread pattern of 
discrimination against churches as compared to secular places of assembly, and of 
discrimination against small and unfamiliar denominations as compared to larger 
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the evidence gathered, noted that discrimination often “lurks 
behind such vague and universally applicable reasons as traffic, 
aesthetics, or ‘not consistent with the city’s land use plan.’ ”142  
Therefore, the senators concluded, “discrimination against 
religious [land] uses is a nationwide problem” demanding a 
federal solution.143 
Congress’ solution was the Religious Land Use and 
Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (“RLUIPA”), sponsored by 
Senators Hatch and Kennedy.144  The Act passed easily, enjoying 
broad bipartisan support.145  The purpose of the Act was to 
restore, to the extent permissible, the pre-Smith balance in the 
areas of land use regulation and institutionalized persons—that 
is, prisoners.146  The scope was remarkably less than RFRA’s had 
been. 
The “equal terms” provision is one of the protections 
provided for free exercise by the statute, stating that “[n]o 
government shall impose or implement a land use regulation in a 
manner that treats a religious assembly or institution on less 
than equal terms with a nonreligious assembly or institution.”147  
The congressional record includes statements indicating that the 
provisions of the statute were in large part codifications of 
existing free exercise jurisprudence, such as Smith and Lukumi, 
to, Congress hoped, avoid a repeat of Boerne.148  In the land use 
half of the statute, section (a) appears to be a codification of 
Sherbert as defined by Smith.149  Section (b)’s provisions appear 
 
and more familiar ones. This factual record is itself sufficient to support prophylactic 
rules . . . .”). 
142 Id. at S7774. 
143 Id. at S7775. 
144 See id. at S7774. 
145 See HAMILTON supra note 14, at 96 (“President Clinton went on to say: 
‘[Senators Hatch and Kennedy’s] work in passing this legislation once again 
demonstrates that people of all political bents and faiths can work together for a 
common purpose that benefits all Americans.’ ”). 
146 See 146 CONG. REC. S7778 (daily ed. July 27, 2000) (joint statement of Sen. 
Hatch and Sen. Kennedy). 
147 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(b)(1) (2006). 
148 “Each subsection closely tracks the legal standards in one or more Supreme 
Court opinions, codifying those standards for greater visibility and easier 
enforceability.” 146 CONG. REC. S7775 (daily ed. July 27, 2000). The record 
specifically cites to both Smith and Lukumi shortly after this statement. Id. at 
S7775–76. 
149 See infra Part III.A. 
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to be a codification of the Smith-Lukumi line of cases.150  How 
well and to what extent the statute’s terms adopt these 
precedents has, however, been heavily argued. 
D.  Conclusion—State of the Law on the Eve of RLUIPA 
Sherbert today is severely restricted and is no longer the 
default rule.  Rather, the default rule is now that of Smith, which 
allows for some burdening of religious exercise provided that 
such burdens are due to neutral laws of general applicability.151  
However, should a law be found to be non-neutral and not 
generally applicable, as was the case in Lukumi, strict scrutiny 
may still apply.  Furthermore, the inquiry into neutrality and 
general applicability is not limited to the terms of the challenged 
statute.  Rather, neutrality may be violated if the effects of the 
statute are applied in a gerrymandered fashion or with a 
discriminatory motive. 
Congress may act to protect free exercise, but must do so in a 
fashion that operates within the bounds defined by the Supreme 
Court.  RLUIPA, the latest congressional attempt to protect free 
exercise, attempts to do so by adopting many of the Supreme 
Court’s precedents as its rules.  To date, the Supreme Court has 
not reviewed the land use portion of RLUIPA to determine 
whether Congress did so properly.  Other courts have, however, 
and this Note’s focus now turns there. 
II. CIRCUIT BREAKER—THE THREE INTERPRETATIONS OF 
“EQUAL TERMS” 
To date, three circuit courts of appeals have dealt with 
RLUIPA’s “equal terms” provision in highly similar contexts and 
have each come to very different conclusions as to its application.  
In this Part, each circuit’s approach will be presented and 
analyzed in chronological order.  Therefore, Section A concerns 
the Eleventh Circuit’s handling of Midrash Sephardi in 2004; 
Section B concerns the Third Circuit’s treatment of Lighthouse in 
2007; and, lastly, Section C concerns the Seventh Circuit’s 
 
150 See infra Part III.A. 
151 However, following Smith at least twelve states had by 2006 passed statutes 
similar to the federal RFRA. See HAMILTON, supra note 14, at 109. In these states, 
the Sherbert rule may, depending on the precise formulation, still apply generally. 
See id. 
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disposition of River of Life in 2010.  In Section D, a simple fact 
pattern will be presented and each circuit’s approach applied to it 
to illustrate in concrete terms the application of each test. 
A. The Eleventh Circuit—Midrash Sephardi 
Confronted with a situation where the local zoning scheme 
excluded religious assemblies while allowing secular assemblies, 
the Eleventh Circuit held the “equal terms” provision violated.152 
The town of Surfside, Florida was a small municipality of 
approximately one square mile.  Nonetheless, the town had 
contrived to divide itself into eight separate zones.153  The town’s 
zoning plan stated that any land use not specifically permitted in 
a zone was prohibited in that zone.154  Religious land uses—in the 
words of the statute, “churches and synagogues”155—were 
prohibited in all but one zone, and even there required a 
“conditional use permit” granted at the town’s discretion.156  The 
area along the main road through town had been zoned as a 
commercial district.157  In this zone retail shopping, personal 
services, theaters, restaurants, private clubs, social clubs, lodge 
halls, dance studios, music instruction studios, modeling schools, 
language schools, and schools of athletic instruction were 
expressly allowed.158  Churches and synagogues were 
prohibited.159  The town’s intention in doing so was to create a 
bustling business center to bolster year round tax revenue160 and 
improve the town’s economic position vis-à-vis its neighbors.161 
 
 
 
 
152 Midrash Sephardi, Inc. v. Town of Surfside, 366 F.3d 1214, 1243 (11th Cir. 
2004). 
153 Id. at 1219. 
154 Id. 
155 Id. 
156 See id. 
157 See id. at 1219–20. 
158 Id. at 1220. 
159 Id. 
160 Id. at 1219–1222. Surfside’s economy was otherwise dominated by tourism. 
See id. at 1219 (“[Surfside] has approximately 4,300 residents and an additional 
estimated tourist population of 2,030.”). 
161 Id. at 1221–22. 
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Midrash Sephardi and Young Israel of Bal Harbour were two 
small Jewish congregations that chose to share rented space on 
the second floor of a building located in the commercial district.162  
The town denied Midrash’s applications for permits to operate as 
a synagogue in their rented space.163  Midrash never appealed 
these denials.164  Young Israel never applied for any permits or 
variances.165  The two congregations joined to file an “equal 
terms” claim against the town, asserting that they had been 
treated on less than equal terms as compared to a non-religious 
assembly.166  The district court granted summary judgment in 
favor of Surfside. 167  The congregations appealed.168 
The Eleventh Circuit first noted that the “equal terms” 
provision had the “ ‘feel’ of an equal protection law”169 but lacked 
any explicit similarly situated requirement.170  The court, 
therefore, concluded that the relevant consideration was whether 
land uses within the statute’s “natural perimeter”171 were treated 
on “equal terms.”  From the terms of the statute, the court 
determined the “natural perimeter” for comparison provided by 
the statute was all assemblies and institutions.172 
However, the statute failed to define what qualifies as either 
an assembly or an institution.173  In the absence of any statutory 
definition, the court defaulted to the plain meaning of the terms 
as found in the dictionary.174  Thus, assembly was defined as “a 
company of persons collected together in one place [usually] and 
 
162 Id. at 1220. Young Israel had been leasing space in the Coronado Hotel in 
Surfside’s tourist district, but the building had been sold out from under them 
forcing them to join with Midrash temporarily. See id. 
163 Id. 
164 Id. 
165 See id. at 1220–21. 
166 Id. at 1223, 1228–29. 
167 Id. at 1223. 
168 Id. at 1222–23. 
169 Id. at 1229. 
170 Id. 
171 Id. at 1230. The “natural perimeter” language is derived from Justice 
Harlan’s concurrence in Walz v. Tax Comm’n of New York. See 397 U.S. 664, 696 
(1970) (Harlan, J., concurring) (“In any particular case the critical question is 
whether the circumference of legislation encircles a class so broad that it can be 
fairly concluded that religious institutions could be thought to fall within the natural 
perimeter.”). 
172 Midrash Sephardi, 366 F.3d at 1230. 
173 Id. 
174 Id. 
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usually for some common purpose (as deliberation and 
legislation, worship, or social entertainment),”175 or, more simply, 
“a group gathered for a common purpose.”176  An institution was 
likewise given its basic dictionary definition of “an established 
society or corporation: an establishment or foundation esp. of a 
public character.”177 
Midrash and Young Israel were clearly assemblies under the 
definition chosen.  Thus, the question became whether the 
congregations were treated on less than “equal terms” versus 
secular assemblies.178  The court focused the ordinance’s explicit 
allowance of “private clubs” in the zone.179  “Private clubs” were 
likewise adjudged to be assemblies within the natural perimeter 
of the statute.180  Thus, the conclusion became obvious:  By 
allowing a secular assembly such as a private club to site in the 
zone, while precluding a religious assembly such as Midrash and 
Young Israel from doing so, the ordinances treated the 
assemblies on different terms in violation of the statute.181 
The court then turned to the issue of what standard to apply.  
Holding the “equal terms” provision to be the codification of the 
Smith-Lukumi line of cases, the court concluded that the same 
rules should apply in the case of an “equal terms” violation.182  
Thus, the challenged statute would be subject to strict scrutiny:  
Surfside must therefore adduce a compelling state interest for 
the inequality and prove the means adopted to be the least 
restrictive possible.183  The court then invalidated the ordinances 
on the basis that the ordinances were not narrowly tailored, 
being simultaneously overinclusive and underinclusive.184 
Surfside, however, challenged the constitutionality of the 
statute on several bases.185  Relevant here is only Surfside’s 
attack on the statute as being beyond Congress’ section five 
 
175 Id. (quoting WEBSTER’S 3D NEW INT’L UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 131 (1993)) 
176 Id. at 1231 (court’s rephrasing of the definition). 
177 Id. at 1230 (quoting WEBSTER’S 3D NEW INT’L UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 1171 
(1993)). 
178 See id. at 1231. 
179 Id. 
180 Id. 
181 Id. 
182 Id. at 1232. 
183 See id. 
184 Id. at 1234–35. 
185 Id. at 1235–36. 
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powers under the Fourteenth Amendment.186  The court found 
these contentions to be without merit.187  First, the court noted 
that Congress had, unlike in RFRA, compiled a significant record 
of discrimination and had expressly stated in the legislative 
history its intention to codify existing Supreme Court 
precedent.188  Second, the court noted that Congress enacted the 
statute as a remedial measure to correct the discrimination noted 
in the congressional record, permitting a broad interpretation.189  
Furthermore, because of the record of discrimination established, 
the statute could not be said to be either out of proportion or 
incongruent to the problem asserted.190  Hence, RLUIPA was 
upheld as constitutional.191 
B.  The Third Circuit—Lighthouse 
Presented with a comprehensive redevelopment plan seeking 
to create a culturally “vibrant” and “vital” downtown commercial 
district, the Third Circuit held that religious land uses could be 
excluded provided other land uses having similar effects on the 
plan’s “regulatory goals” were likewise excluded.192  Accordingly, 
the Third Circuit did not find the redevelopment plan violated 
the “equal terms” provision.193 
The Lighthouse Institute for Evangelism was a religious 
organization that sought to “minister to the poor and 
disadvantaged in downtown Long Branch, New Jersey.”194  To 
better serve the poor and disadvantaged, Lighthouse purchased a 
building in downtown Long Branch, a depressed neighborhood  
 
 
 
186 See id. at 1236. Surfside also challenged the statute as a violation of the 
Establishment Clause, relying on Justice Stevens’ concurrence in Boerne, and as a 
violation of the Tenth Amendment. Id. Both challenges were unsuccessful, and are 
beyond the scope of this Note. See id. 
187 Id. at 1239–40. 
188 Id. at 1231–32, 1236, 1239–40. 
189 See id. at 1239. 
190 Id. 
191 Id. at 1239–40. 
192 Lighthouse Inst. for Evangelism, Inc. v. City of Long Branch, 510 F.3d 253, 
272 (3d Cir. 2007). 
193 Id. 
194 Id. at 256. 
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with a large population living below the poverty line.195  
Lighthouse proceeded to apply for the appropriate permits from 
the city.196 
Long Branch had, however, enacted a comprehensive 
redevelopment plan to revitalize the depressed downtown area in 
which Lighthouse wished to site.197  Under the terms of the plan, 
any land use not expressly allowed was prohibited as in 
Midrash.198  Expressly allowed and encouraged were commercial 
land uses such as restaurants, bars, theaters, cinemas, retail 
dance studios, culinary schools, art workshops and studios, and 
fashion design schools.199  Religious land uses, schools,200 and 
government buildings were prohibited by dint of their 
omission.201  The city’s stated purpose was to “[s]trengthen[] 
retail trade and City revenues,” and to encourage a culturally 
“vibrant” and “vital” downtown district with a well developed 
retail sector.202 
The city denied Lighthouse’s application to operate as a 
church in the zone as the redevelopment plan prohibited such 
uses.203  Thereafter, Lighthouse filed an “equal terms” claim,204 
 
195 See id. at 278 (Jordan, J., dissenting). 
196 Id. at 279–80. 
197 Id. at 258 (majority opinion). 
198 Id. 
199 Id. 
200 Specifically, elementary, middle and high schools were proscribed. Id. 
Certain specialty schools, such as culinary schools, were specifically allowed. See id. 
201 Id. 
202 Id. 
203 Id. at 259. 
204 The full procedural history is much more complicated than the abbreviated 
facts recounted in the main text. Lighthouse purchased the building in dispute in 
1994. Id. at 257. Despite initial support from local leaders, the project soon ran into 
problems and Lighthouse’s permit applications were denied. Id. at 278–80 (Jordan, 
J., dissenting). Between 1994 and 2001, Lighthouse applied for many permits and 
variances seeking approval for a church and soup kitchen, all of which were denied. 
Id. at 279–80. In 2001, Lighthouse filed for a preliminary injunction to compel Long 
Branch to grant Lighthouse’s zoning permit. Id. at 280. The district court ruled for 
Long Branch, and the Third Circuit affirmed. Id. During this first round of 
litigation, Long Branch enacted the redevelopment plan. Id. at 280. Lighthouse 
sought approval for a church under the new plan, but was again denied. Id. at 281–
82. In 2004, Lighthouse amended its complaint, adding RLUIPA and constitutional 
claims against Long Branch as to both the Redevelopment Plan and the prior 
ordinance. Id. at 282. In 2005, the district court granted summary judgment as to all 
claims for Long Branch. Id. Discussed in the main text is the appeal from the 2005 
district court decision. 
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asserting less than equal treatment as compared to secular 
assemblies allowed by the statute.205  Taking its lead from 
Midrash, Lighthouse argued that where any secular assembly is 
allowed under the zoning ordinance, a religious assembly must 
also be allowed.206 
The city argued that allowing religious land uses and schools 
would utterly thwart the city’s purpose in enacting the 
redevelopment plan.207  The city asserted that the omission of 
religious land uses and schools was due to a New Jersey statute 
that prohibited the granting of liquor licenses within a specified 
distance of such land uses.208  A church, therefore, would create a 
zone around itself wherein no restaurants, bars, or clubs could 
site, thereby frustrating the city’s attempt to foster a culturally 
“vibrant” and “vital” downtown.209 
The court, siding with the city, rejected Lighthouse’s 
invitation to adopt the Eleventh Circuit’s Midrash test.210  The 
court stated that the rule adopted in Midrash was far too 
expansive and was liable to exceed Congress’ powers under 
section five of the Fourteenth Amendment.211  The lack of a 
similarly situated requirement in the Midrash test coupled with 
the broad definition of “assembly” and “institution” created a 
standard with no boundaries.212  According to the Third Circuit, 
under the Midrash test 
if a town allows a local, ten-member book club to meet in the 
senior center, it must also permit a large church with a 
thousand members—or, to take examples from the Free 
Exercise caselaw, it must permit a religious assembly with 
rituals involving sacrificial killings of animals or the  
 
 
 
 
 
205 See id. at 259. 
206 Id. at 267. 
207 See id. at 270. 
208 Id. 
209 Id. at 270–71. 
210 See id. at 268. 
211 See id. at 267 n.11, 268 & nn.12–13. 
212 See id. at 268 n.12. 
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participation of wild bears213—to locate in the same 
neighborhood regardless of the impact such a religious entity 
might have on the envisioned character of the [neighborhood].214 
The Third Circuit held such a test would create an 
affirmative right on the part of religious organizations to ignore 
zoning ordinances.215  Such a result, the court stated, ran counter 
to both the text of the statute and the intent of Congress.216 
The court held a religious plaintiff must show that it was 
treated on less than “equal terms” as compared to a secular 
assembly similarly situated as to the challenged regulation’s 
“regulatory purpose.”217  In arriving at this conclusion, the court 
began by looking at the legislative history behind RLUIPA.218  
Relying upon statements by members and committees of the 
House of Representatives and the Senate, the court concluded 
that RLUIPA was a precise codification of the Smith-Lukumi line 
of cases.219  Specifically, the “equal terms” provision codified 
Lukumi.  Lukumi and other Third Circuit precedents, the court 
continued, required that the challenged regulation be analyzed 
by the effects activities had upon the challenged statute’s 
“regulatory purpose.”220 
 
 
213 As fantastic as this reference may seem, the court is referring to Blackhawk 
v. Pennsylvania, a Third Circuit precedent written by then Circuit Judge Samuel 
Alito. 381 F.3d 202 (3d Cir. 2004). The Lakota Indians, of which plaintiff, though 
Lenape by blood, was one by adoption, hold black bears to be protectors of the Earth, 
essential to sanctify religious ceremonies and imbue worshippers with spiritual 
strength. Id. at 204. Plaintiff purchased in 1994 two black bear cubs, named Timber 
and Tundra, and began holding Lakota religious ceremonies on his property with 
them. Id. Pennsylvania requires a permit to keep such animals, and, beginning in 
1997, there began a dispute as to the permit necessary. See id. at 205. Plaintiff 
claimed, on the basis of the Free Exercise clause, that he was exempt from needing 
to obtain the more expensive permit Pennsylvania claimed he needed. See id. Also, 
in 2000, the bears got loose and bit two people, resulting in the Pennsylvania Game 
Commission seeking an order to destroy Timber and Tundra. See id. at 206. The 
court accepted the Free Exercise claim, and separately prevented the destruction of 
the bears. See id. at 206, 214, 216.  
214 Lighthouse, 510 F.3d at 268. 
215 See id. at 269 n.14. 
216 Id. at 268. 
217 Id. at 266. 
218 Id. at 263. 
219 See id. at 264–65. 
220 Id. at 264–67. 
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Here, the court held schools and religious land uses were 
similarly situated as to the regulatory purpose by reason of the 
New Jersey statute limiting the availability of liquor licenses 
near schools and churches.221  The two land uses had similar 
effects upon the regulatory purpose as both, by operation of the 
New Jersey statute, would create areas around themselves 
wherein no restaurants, clubs, and bars could site, thereby 
frustrating Long Branch’s purpose of creating a culturally “vital” 
and “vibrant” downtown area.222  The redevelopment plan, 
therefore, prohibited the two land uses that would have 
detrimental effects upon the redevelopment plan’s goals.223  
Consequently, there was no violation of the “equal terms” 
provision.224  The court noted, however, that had a violation been 
found, the city would have been strictly liable.225 
C. The Seventh Circuit—River of Life 
The Seventh Circuit held that where a municipality sought 
through the application of “accepted zoning criteri[a]” to create a 
pure commercial district, there was no “equal terms” violation 
when the religious and secular assemblies similarly situated as 
to those “accepted zoning criteri[a]” were excluded.226 
The village of Hazel Crest, Illinois, located some miles 
outside of Chicago Heights, was a small town in the midst of 
economic difficulties.227  Its downtown area by the railroad 
station had been depressed for some time.228  In an effort to 
revitalize the area, the village adopted a zoning plan that 
endeavored to create a pure commercial zone in and around the 
 
221 Id. at 272. 
222 Id. 
223 Id. 
224 Id. The court did, however, find that the prior zoning ordinance did violate 
the “equal terms” provision. See id. at 272–73. As the record did not disclose the 
aims of the prior ordinance, and Long Branch failed to raise a triable issue of fact as 
to whether the ordinance treated religious and non-religious assemblies on less than 
“equal terms,” Lighthouse was entitled to summary judgment. Id. However, because 
the ordinance had been superseded by the redevelopment plan, only monetary 
damages, including attorney’s fees, were available to Lighthouse. Id. at 273. 
225 Id. at 269. 
226 River of Life Kingdom Ministries v. Vill. of Hazel Crest, 611 F.3d 367, 373–74 
(7th Cir. 2010). 
227 Id. at 368. 
228 Id. 
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train station, the logic being that the proximity to the station 
would encourage traffic to bolster local business and tax 
revenue.229  Additionally, the village offered tax incentives to 
businesses that would site in the zone.230  As of July 2010, no 
businesses had moved to take advantage of those tax 
incentives.231 
River of Life Kingdom Ministries was a small congregation of 
about thirty regularly attending members that purchased an old 
warehouse and office232 in the new commercial zone with the 
intention of renovating it into a church.233  At the time of 
purchase, River of Life was aware of the zoning plan, but went 
ahead with the purchase on the basis of some faulty legal 
advice—the faultiness of which was revealed when the church’s 
permits to operate as a church were denied by the village.234  
Thereafter, River of Life proceeded to file an “equal terms” claim 
against Hazel Crest.235 
The Seventh Circuit began by first surveying, and rejecting, 
the approaches of its sister circuit courts.  Judge Posner, writing 
for the majority, rejected the Midrash test essentially for the 
 
229 River of Life Kingdom Ministries v. Vill. of Hazel Crest, No. 08 C 0950, 2008 
WL 4865568, at *2 (N.D. Ill. July 14, 2008), aff’d, 611 F.3d 367 (7th Cir. 2010). 
230 See id. 
231 See River of Life, 611 F.3d at 375 n.1 (Manion, J., concurring). 
232 Id. at 368 (majority opinion). Between the various opinions in the River of 
Life case there is some disagreement as to what the building in question was. The 
district court recorded the building purchased as an “old warehouse and office.” 
River of Life, 2008 WL 4865568 at *2. Judge Manion in his concurrence and Judge 
Sykes in her dissent identify the building as an “abandoned car wash.” River of Life, 
611 F.3d at 375 n.1 (Manion, J., concurring); id. at 377 (Sykes, J., dissenting) (“The 
property formerly housed a car wash . . . .”). The author investigated the matter 
using Google’s Street View, and, based on the photographs, his personal experience 
with his family’s car wash business, and his father’s more than forty year car wash 
experience, has determined that the district court was almost certainly correct. 
16842 Park Ave., Hazel Crest, Ill. 60429, GOOGLE, http://maps.google.com/ 
maps?q=16842+Park+Ave.,+Hazel+Crest,+Ill.+60429&hl=en&sll=40.733432,-
73.992452&sspn=0.074794,0.154324&hnear=16842+Park+Ave,+Hazel+Crest,+Cook,
+Illinois+60429&t=m&z=16 (last visited Jan. 20, 2013). 
233 River of Life, 2008 WL 4865568 at *2. 
234 See River of Life, 611 F.3d at 378 (Sykes, J., dissenting). 
235 Id. Hazel Crest was granted summary judgment in the district court, and had 
this grant affirmed by a Seventh Circuit panel. Id. at 368 (majority opinion). 
Subsequently, River of Life’s petition for a rehearing en banc was granted, resulting 
in the opinion discussed in the main text. Id. 
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same reasons as the Third Circuit.236  The court likewise rejected 
the Lighthouse test as too friendly to municipalities, and for 
entailing an inquiry into legislative history not likely to be 
profitable.237 
The court, however, agreed with the general thrust of the 
Lighthouse test.238 That is, the court agreed as to the need for a 
similarly situated requirement similar to a “regulatory purpose” 
to limit the statute’s scope and the danger of an unbounded 
interpretation, such as that of Midrash, exceeding Congress’ 
powers.239  The court reasoned that the key defect of the 
Lighthouse test—the reliance upon a subjective standard—could 
be solved by a shift from “regulatory purpose” to “accepted zoning 
criteria.”240  “ ‘Purpose,’ ” Judge Posner wrote, 
“is . . . manipulable” whereas “ ‘[r]egulatory criteria’ are 
objective—and it is federal judges who will apply the criteria to 
resolve the issue.”241 
The court then turned to what “accepted zoning criteria” 
included.242  After providing a brief survey of the history of 
cumulative and exclusive zoning, the court explained that these 
criteria include such traditional Euclidean zoning considerations 
as health, safety, and morals as well as concepts such as traffic 
and tax revenue generation.243  Thus, for example, a theater and 
a church would be similar as to “traffic” as both land uses tended 
towards concentrated comings and goings of persons, either at 
the end of a show or at the end of a religious service.244 
 
236 See id. at 370. Furthermore, Judge Posner noted that the markedly more 
favorable treatment of religious organizations over similar secular organizations 
under the Eleventh Circuit’s test may raise Establishment Clause problems. Id. (“A 
subtler objection to the test is that it may be too friendly to religious land uses, 
unduly limiting municipal regulation and maybe even violating the First 
Amendment’s prohibition against establishment of religion by discriminating in 
favor of religious land uses.”). This statement appears to be based solely on Justice 
Stevens’s concurrence in Boerne. See supra note 137; River of Life, 611 F.3d at 375–
76 (Manion, J., concurring). Whatever the validity of these concerns, they are beyond 
the scope of this Note. 
237 See River of Life, 611 F.3d at 371. 
238 See id. 
239 Id. at 370–71. 
240 Id. at 371. 
241 Id.  
242 Id. 
243 Id. at 371–72. 
244 Id. at 373. 
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Applying the criteria here, the court concluded that Hazel 
Crest truly had simply applied accepted zoning criteria in its 
attempt to carve out a pure commercial district.245  The court 
noted that the zoning ordinance specifically excluded other 
assemblies and institutions similar to churches, in the abstract, 
as to their tax generation and traffic potential.246  Thus, River of 
Life had no reasonable hope of success, and the court affirmed 
the grant of summary judgment to Hazel Crest.247 
D. A Simple Fact Pattern To Illustrate Each Circuit’s 
Approach248 
The town of Rusty Wrench had fallen on hard times.  
Located in the Rust Belt, the heavy industry that had once 
formed the basis of the economy had been in decline for decades.  
The recent economic downturn signaled the death knell for the 
remaining industry in the town.  The downtown area along the 
river, formerly a picture perfect American downtown replete with 
small Mom and Pop shops, had become run-down and was 
characterized by numerous boarded up shop windows and a 
decaying Woolworth’s department store. 
City leaders seeking to reverse the downward spiral and 
boost sagging tax revenues enacted a comprehensive 
redevelopment plan for the downtown area.  In the downtown 
area, small boutique shops and restaurants were encouraged and 
property tax incentives were offered to businesses that would site 
there.  Specifically allowed land uses included boutique shops, 
small retail stores, restaurants, cafés, catering halls, professional 
offices, and specialty schools such as dance, cooking, and art 
schools.  The town’s purpose was to create a “vital” and “vibrant” 
downtown area with a strong retail sector that would attract new 
investment and attract a new younger demographic. 
Reverend Elmer Gantry was a traveling minister operating 
in the tri-county area.  He became renowned for his revival 
meetings, and after many years of such revivals had finally, 
 
245 Id. at 373–74. 
246 Id. Land uses held to be similar to a religious land use, and likewise 
prohibited in the zone included “community centers, schools, and art galleries.” Id. 
at 368. 
247 Id. at 373–74. 
248 This fact pattern is the creation of the author and is not from any case. 
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through tithes and donations, raised enough money to establish a 
proper church.  Familiar with Rusty Wrench, and appreciating 
its central location in the area where his followers lived, 
Reverend Gantry looked to the depressed downtown by the river. 
Forming Riverside Revival Ministries, Inc., Reverend Gantry 
purchased the abandoned Woolworth store in the downtown 
zone.  He promptly sought the appropriate permits to renovate 
the building into a church.  His applications were denied, and the 
matter soon made it to federal court. 
Supposing this occurred in the Eleventh Circuit, the first 
question to be answered is whether the proposed religious use is 
an assembly within the meaning of the “equal terms” provision.249  
Clearly, Reverend Gantry’s church is a religious assembly within 
the statute’s “natural perimeter.” 
Next, the court would determine whether the challenged 
ordinance allowed any other secular assembly to site within the 
zone.250  Here, the court would likely hone in on the express 
allowance of catering halls, though the inclusion of any assembly, 
including restaurants and cafés, would work as well given the 
terms of the analysis.  Given a definition of an “assembly” as a 
“group gathered for a common purpose,”251 a catering hall would 
be adjudged to be an assembly within the “natural perimeter” of 
the “equal terms” provision’s language.  
Thus, as a secular assembly is expressly allowed while a 
religious assembly is excluded, “equal terms” is violated.  Thus, 
the burden would shift to Rusty Wrench to adduce a compelling 
state interest and to demonstrate that the means adopted were 
the narrowest possible.252  The town’s interest in creating a 
“vital” and “vibrant” downtown to increase tax revenues would 
not rise to the level of being compelling.  Therefore, Rusty 
Wrench would be compelled to grant Reverend Gantry’s zoning 
permit. 
 
 
 
249 See Midrash Sephardi, Inc. v. Town of Surfside, 366 F.3d 1214, 1230 (11th 
Cir. 2004).  
250 See id. 
251 Id. at 1231. 
252 See id. at 1232. 
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However, supposing Rusty Wrench was within the Third 
Circuit’s jurisdiction, the first step would be to determine the 
challenged ordinance’s “regulatory purpose.”253  Here, the 
regulatory purpose is to create a “vital” and “vibrant” downtown 
to increase tax revenues. 
The next step is to determine whether the statute is 
internally consistent in promoting that regulatory purpose.254  As 
the ordinance excludes all non-commercial uses that, like 
religious land uses, would not generate tax revenues, the court 
would likely rule that as to the underlying purpose of increasing 
tax revenues the ordinance is internally consistent.  Therefore, 
the town excluded just those land uses that would have a 
detrimental effect upon the tax revenue generation purpose.  
Consequently there would be no “equal terms” violation, and the 
court would rule for Rusty Wrench against Reverend Gantry. 
Finally, if Rusty Wrench was located within the Seventh 
Circuit’s jurisdiction, the court would first determine the 
“accepted zoning criteria” Rusty Wrench used in creating its 
zoning plan.255  Here, the town clearly was crafting their zoning 
scheme in such a way as to maximize tax revenues. 
The court would next determine whether all land uses 
similarly situated as to the zoning criteria used were treated on 
“equal terms.”256  Here, the zoning ordinance created a pure 
commercial zone seeking to maximize taxable revenue.  Land 
uses that do not produce property tax or sales tax revenues, 
including religious land uses, were all excluded under the terms 
of the statute, which allowed exclusively tax paying, profit 
seeking enterprises such as restaurants, boutique shops, 
professional offices and the like.  Thus, the court would likely 
hold that Rusty Wrench had simply applied accepted zoning 
criteria and had treated all land uses equally on the basis of 
those criteria, and therefore hold for Rusty Wrench against 
Reverend Gantry. 
 
253 See Lighthouse Inst. for Evangelism, Inc. v. City of Long Branch, 510 F.3d 
253, 270 (3d Cir. 2007). 
254 See id. at 272. 
255 See River of Life Kingdom Ministries, Inc. v. Vill. of Hazel Crest, 611 F.3d 
367, 373 (7th Cir. 2010). 
256 See id. at 373–74. 
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III. A RE-INTERPRETATION OF “EQUAL TERMS” 
This Part is divided into three sections.  The first Section 
introduces the canons of statutory construction that should guide 
and constrain the proper interpretation of the “equal terms” 
provision.  RLUIPA as a whole is also presented to put the “equal 
terms” provision in its proper context as it relates to the rest of 
the statute.  The second Section critiques the current three 
interpretations.  Finally, Section three presents a proposed 
solution to the current circuit split based on Judge Sykes’s 
interpretation of the “equal terms” provision. 
A. Limiting Canons of Construction. 
A basic canon of statutory construction is that a part of the 
statute should not be interpreted in such a way as to render it or 
other sections of the statute superfluous.257  In RLUIPA, the 
“equal terms” provision does not stand alone as the sole 
protection for religious land uses.  Rather, the statute provides 
three other specific protections. 
First, subsection (a)(1) provides that “[n]o government shall 
impose or implement a land use regulation in a manner that 
imposes a substantial burden on the religious exercise of a 
person, including a religious assembly or institution, unless the 
government” can demonstrate the regulation is in furtherance of 
a compelling state interest and the means adopted are the least 
restrictive possible.258  The application of this section is 
conditioned on the fulfillment of one of three jurisdictional tests 
outlined in subsection (a)(2) being fulfilled: (A) “the substantial 
burden is imposed in a program or activity that receives Federal 
financial assistance,” (B) the substantial burden affects 
interstate commerce, and (C) the substantial burden is imposed 
pursuant to a system that makes “individualized assessments of 
the proposed uses for the property involved.”259 
Thus, section (a) taken as a whole operates to restore the 
Sherbert test in those areas left open by the Court in Smith.260  
That is, by the terms of the statute, Sherbert applies in situations 
 
257 See Corley v. United States, 556 U.S. 303, 314 (2009). 
258 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)(1). 
259 Id. § 2000cc(a)(2). 
260 River of Life, 611 F.3d at 381 (Sykes, J., dissenting). 
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involving individualized assessments,261 where the federal 
government has effectively federalized an area via financial 
support,262 and where a challenger to a regulation can make a 
claim intertwined with another right or power contained in the 
Constitution.263  Also significant is the self-contained nature of 
section (a), which clearly indicates Congress’ intent to keep 
section (a)’s jurisdictional tests and compelling interest standard 
separate from the provisions in section (b).264 
Second, subsection (b)(2) provides that “[n]o government 
shall impose or implement a land use regulation that 
discriminates against any assembly or institution on the basis of 
religion or religious denomination.”265  Thus, a town could not, for 
example, enact an ordinance that prevents a Santeria church 
from operating, while allowing other religions to do so.266  This 
provision is essentially a codification of Lukumi.267  Where a 
statute has as its object the regulation or suppression of religious 
exercise, the challenged ordinance is presumptively invalid.268  
However, unlike Lukumi, this provision, through its lack of any 
statement regarding the standard applied, operates as a strict 
liability statute, thus giving the challenged government no 
possible escape once a violation is found.269 
Finally, subsection (b)(3) provides that a government may 
not impose a land use regulation that either: (A) “totally excludes 
religious assemblies from a jurisdiction,” or (B) “unreasonably 
limits religious assemblies, institutions, or structures within a 
jurisdiction.”270  The general rule derived is that a government 
may not totally exclude religious land uses from its 
 
261 Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 884 (1990). 
262 See 146 CONG. REC. S7775 (daily ed. July 27, 2000) (joint statement of Sen. 
Hatch and Sen. Kennedy). 
263 See Smith, 494 U.S. at 881. 
264 See River of Life, 611 F.3d at 370–71; Lighthouse Inst. for Evangelism, Inc. v. 
City of Long Branch, 510 F.3d 253, 269 (3d Cir. 2007).  
265 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(b)(2). 
266 See supra notes 105–14 and accompanying text. 
267 See supra notes 106–15 and accompanying text. 
268 See River of Life, 611 F.3d at 381–82 (Sykes, J., dissenting). 
269 See id. 
270 § 2000cc(b)(3). This subsection, by including only assemblies in (A) while 
including “assemblies, institutions, or structures” in (B), implies that there is a 
substantive difference between the categories of assembles and institutions. Id. That 
is, certain land uses are, presumably, institutions only. However, this distinction, 
such as it may be, is beyond the scope of this Note. 
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jurisdiction.271  Interestingly, however, part (B) of the subsection 
implies that there are reasonable grounds for excluding religious 
land uses from specific areas within a jurisdiction.  Thus, so as 
not to render (B) superfluous, there must be some circumstances 
under which none of the statute’s provisions, properly 
interpreted, have any vitality, thereby allowing a government to 
zone freely even as against religious land uses under some 
circumstances, provided such zoning does not result in total 
exclusion from the jurisdiction. 
A second canon of statutory construction is the doctrine of 
constitutional avoidance.  The doctrine allows courts to interpret 
a statute in a narrower fashion to preserve its constitutionality 
where there is cause to believe a broader reading suggested by 
the statute’s plain terms may prove unconstitutional.272  
However, this doctrine is subject to two requirements.  First, the 
broader reading must strongly suggest its unconstitutionality.273  
Second, the narrower reading must be consonant with the 
legislative intent underlying it.274  That is, the narrower reading 
must still serve the legislative purpose and cannot be read to 
frustrate that purpose.275 
Here, the potential constitutional issue is that the “equal 
terms” provision by its plain terms may exceed Congress’ section 
five powers under the Fourteenth Amendment.276  Specifically, 
the “equal terms” provision may define a new right of religious 
assemblies and institutions to ignore neutral laws of general 
applicability, rather than guaranteeing to them rights defined in 
the Constitution and by the Supreme Court’s precedents.277 
The statute itself does not provide a definition of assembly or 
institution.  Thus, if one were to, like the Eleventh Circuit, use a 
standard dictionary definition, the scope of the statute would be 
 
271  River of Life, 611 F.3d at 381–82 (Sykes, J., dissenting). 
272  United States v. Fuey Moy, 241 U.S. 394, 401 (1916) (“A statute must be 
construed, if fairly possible, so as to avoid not only the conclusion that it is 
unconstitutional, but also grave doubts upon that score.”) 
273 YULE KIM, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS: STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: 
GENERAL PRINCIPLES AND RECENT TRENDS 21 (2008). 
274 Id. 
275 Id. 
276 See Lighthouse Inst. for Evangelism, Inc. v. City of Long Branch, 510 F.3d 
253, 269 n.14 (3d Cir. 2007). 
277 See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 528–29 (1997).  
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nearly any land use conceivable.278  For example, the Eleventh 
Circuit’s definition of assembly is “ ‘a company of persons 
collected together in one place [usually] and usually for some 
common purpose (as deliberation and legislation, worship, or 
social entertainment).’ ”279  Put more simply, an assembly is a 
gathering of two or more persons for a common purpose.280  With 
such a definition what is not an assembly?  As there is no explicit 
or implicit limiting principle, arguably a restaurant with a staff 
and a regular stream of customers is an assembly.281  After all, 
the patrons, waiters and kitchen staff would be two or more 
persons gathered in one place for a common purpose.  Ergo, 
suppose a town enacted a zoning ordinance allowing only 
restaurants in its “R-1” zone with no exceptions of any sort—a 
truly neutral law—and a religious assembly purchased land 
therein.  The religious assembly could file, and succeed in, an 
action invoking the “equal terms” provision to compel the town to 
grant the religious assembly a permit to site there.  The 
underlying logic would be that if a secular assembly—here a 
restaurant—is allowed by the zoning ordinance, the town must—
to treat religious and non-religious assemblies on “equal terms”—
allow a religious assembly.  The provision’s terms bear this 
result, with the consequence that the religious assembly has 
exercised a private right to ignore a neutral law of general 
applicability unquestionably constitutional as applied to other 
land uses—a “constitutional anomaly.”282 
B. A Critique of the Current Interpretations 
The problem in Midrash as decided by the Eleventh Circuit 
is not its result, but rather its test, which commits two errors.  
First, the application of strict scrutiny here is utterly without 
 
278 See Lighthouse, 510 F.3d at 269 n.14. 
279 Midrash Sephardi, Inc. v. Town of Surfside, 366 F.3d 1214, 1230 (11th Cir. 
2004) (quoting WEBSTER’S 3D NEW INT’L UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 131 (1993)). 
280 Id. at 1231. 
281 In Lighthouse, plaintiff indirectly made this argument. Relying on the 
Midrash test, plaintiff argued that Long Branch, having allowed a panoply of 
“assemblies,” of which bars, clubs, and restaurants were prominent, had to allow 
religious assemblies such as itself to site. See Lighthouse, 510 F.3d at 267–68. 
282 Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 886 (1990). 
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basis in the statute.283  The statute operates as a strict liability 
statute.284  The design of the statute indicates that the compelling 
interest test applies only to section (a) of the statute and does not 
extend to section (b).285  Indeed, the amicus brief submitted by 
the United States argued this very point,286 and the Third and 
Seventh Circuits have both, correctly, held likewise.287 
Second, the interpretation the court gave the statute may be 
“too friendly” to religious interests as noted by the Seventh 
Circuit.288  By using such broad definitions for “assembly” and 
“institution,” the statute implicates far more than is necessary.289  
One would be hard pressed to find a land use under such broad 
definitions that would not qualify as either an “assembly” or 
“institution.”  Indeed, the overinclusiveness of the definitions 
creates an affirmative right on the part of religious assemblies to 
ignore laws of general applicability—a result expressly 
disallowed in both Smith and Boerne.290 
Where the Eleventh Circuit’s test swung too far in favor of 
religious plaintiffs, the pendulum in the Third Circuit swung too 
far in favor of municipalities.  Though the Third Circuit correctly 
held the statute to impose a strict liability standard, the court 
made it all but impossible for a religious plaintiff to succeed in 
proving an “equal terms” violation.291  That is, by defining the 
inquiry entirely in terms of the municipality’s “intent” or 
“regulatory purpose,” a municipality may always escape liability 
provided the asserted purpose is properly tailored.292 
Furthermore, using a subjective standard such as the 
municipality’s “regulatory purpose” requires an inquiry into the 
legislative history underlying the zoning regulation.293  Such an 
inquiry “invites speculation concerning the reason behind 
 
283 See River of Life Kingdom Ministries v. Vill. of Hazel Crest, 611 F.3d 367, 
370–71 (7th Cir. 2010); Lighthouse, 510 F.3d at 268–69. 
284 See Lighthouse, 510 F.3d at 268–69. 
285 See River of Life, 611 F.3d at 382 (Sykes, J., dissenting). 
286 See Midrash Sephardi, Inc. v. Town of Surfside, 366 F.3d 1214, 1231 (11th 
Cir. 2004). 
287 See River of Life, 611 F.3d at 370–71; Lighthouse, 510 F.3d at 268–69. 
288 See River of Life, 611 F.3d at 370. 
289 See Lighthouse, 510 F.3d at 269 n.14. 
290 See id. 
291 See River of Life, 611 F.3d at 371. 
292 See id. 
293 See id. 
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exclusion of churches; invites self-serving testimony by zoning 
officials and hired expert witnesses; [and] facilitates zoning 
classifications thinly disguised as neutral but actually 
systematically unfavorable to churches . . . .”294 
Moreover, the Third Circuit’s test makes the “equal terms” 
provision the equivalent of a Free Exercise claim, rendering the 
statute itself unnecessary.295  When one considers that when 
strict scrutiny applies a statute is almost certain to fail, the 
addition of strict liability by the statute seems to be an 
immaterial addition.296  The court, therefore, by its interpretation 
renders the statute superfluous—in direct violation of basic 
canons of statutory construction.297 
The Seventh Circuit adopted a test that is substantially 
similar to that of the Third Circuit and suffers from many of the 
same flaws.  In her spirited dissent, Judge Sykes argued that, 
(1) the majority’s new test turned the “equal terms” analysis on 
its head, and (2) the “accepted regulatory criteria” analysis was 
effectively the same as the Third Circuit’s “regulatory purpose” in 
effect.298  The majority’s analysis proceeded by comparing River 
of Life’s proposed church to those assemblies already excluded 
under the ordinance.299  Judge Sykes argued that the correct 
mode of analysis was a comparison of the proposed religious use 
against other uses allowed by the ordinance.300  The “equal 
terms” provision’s concern was that religious land uses were 
being treated less well than allowed secular assemblies, not that 
there be equivalence of disallowed uses.301 
 
294 Id. 
295 See Lighthouse, 510 F.3d at 288 (Jordan, J., dissenting). 
296 As the Supreme Court in Boerne explained: 
Requiring a State to demonstrate a compelling interest and show that it 
has adopted the least restrictive means of achieving that interest is the 
most demanding test known to constitutional law. If “compelling interest 
really means what it says . . . , many laws will not meet the test. . . . [The 
test] would open the prospect of constitutionally required religious 
exemptions from civic obligations of almost every conceivable kind.” 
City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 534 (1997) (quoting Emp’t Div., Dep’t of 
Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 888 (1990) (internal quotation marks 
omitted)). 
297 See Lighthouse, 510 F.3d at 288 (Jordan, J., dissenting). 
298 River of Life, 611 F.3d at 386, 388 (Sykes, J., dissenting). 
299 Id. at 373 (majority opinion). 
300 Id. at 387–88 (Sykes, J., dissenting). 
301 Id. at 388. 
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Furthermore, Judge Sykes noted that “accepted zoning 
criteria” was just as amorphous and manipulable by zoning 
officials as “regulatory purpose.”302  Indeed, many “regulatory 
purposes” could easily stand as “zoning criteria.”303  For example, 
a municipality could have as its purpose the increase of tax 
revenues, or apply zoning ordinance using tax generation 
capacity as the criteria for allowing and disallowing land uses.304  
In either case, the municipality would have an easy victory—the 
inquiry having been decided on the municipality’s terms.  Such a 
result clearly runs contrary to Congress’ intent.305 
C. A Proposed Solution 
Judge Sykes’s dissent in River of Life provides an excellent 
starting point for a workable solution.  The proper test, Judge 
Sykes explained, is to assess whether religious and non-religious 
assemblies with a similar “primary purpose” are treated on 
“equal terms” as against each other.306  This approach, therefore, 
adopts the basic definition of an assembly as “a group of persons 
gathered together, usually for a particular purpose” and works 
directly with the common purpose mentioned in the definition.307  
The inquiry, thus, focuses on the individual land uses being 
compared, preventing the municipality from setting the terms of 
the inquiry.  Instead, each party would have an equal chance to 
litigate the equality of treatment between uses permitted.308  
Should a violation be found, the municipality would be held 
strictly liable.309  The test, therefore, by having the terms of the  
 
 
302 Id. at 386. 
303 Id. 
304 See id. (“Routine ‘economic development’ and ‘tax-enhancement’ objectives—
which can be characterized as ‘regulatory purposes’ or ‘accepted zoning criteria’—
will immunize the exclusion of religious land uses from commercial, business, and 
industrial districts because religious assemblies do not advance these objectives and 
for-profit secular assemblies do.”). 
305 See id. at 387, 389. 
306 See id. at 391. 
307 Id. at 389. 
308 See id. at 390 (noting “hotels, motels, gymnasiums, health clubs, salons, 
restaurants, and taverns” as well as “day-care centers” are harder to classify, thus 
making their statuses as “assemblies” within the statute open to debate). 
309 See id. at 370–71 (majority opinion); Lighthouse Inst. for Evangelism, Inc. v. 
City of Long Branch, 510 F.3d 253, 269 (3d Cir. 2007). 
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inquiry set in this manner, would not be lopsided in favor of 
municipalities as it is under the Third and Seventh Circuit 
approaches, and Congress’ intent would be given effect. 
The “primary purpose” of an assembly would be assessed by 
looking at the use in the abstract—what is the usual primary 
“common purpose” of the people assembling for this land use?310  
Incidental purposes should be discarded to appropriately limit 
the inquiry.311  Furthermore, these people assembling for a 
common purpose must share “a degree of group affinity, 
organization, and unity around a common purpose”312 to further 
reasonably circumscribe the statute’s breadth.  Thus, a 
restaurant would not be an assembly equivalent to a church as 
the patrons of a restaurant have hardly any group identity; the 
patrons are simply there because, presumably, they are hungry.  
By contrast, parishioners to a church assemble because of their 
religious identity and to engage in the practice of their religion 
with others who likewise identify themselves with the religion.  
The distinction is clear, reasonable, and workable. 
Applying this test to the Rusty Wrench example of Part II.D 
yields results similar to the Eleventh Circuit’s test, but does so 
while appropriately limiting the inquiry.  The first step in the 
analysis would be to determine which land uses allowed by the 
statute are assemblies within the statute.313  Under the basic 
definition of a group of persons gathered together for a common 
purpose, restaurants, catering halls and specialty schools are all 
clear candidates in this context, despite the commercial nature of 
each.  The next step is to then judge which of the identified 
assemblies implicate a sufficient “degree of group affinity, 
organization, and unity around a common purpose.”314  Of the 
three land uses identified, the specialty schools and catering hall 
land uses would imply such a group identity around a common 
purpose.  First, in the case of the specialty schools, the students 
are generally organized into classes under the leadership of a 
 
310 See River of Life, 611 F.3d at 390 (Sykes, J., dissenting). 
311 Doing otherwise would lead to absurd results where a hotel, the primary 
purpose of which is providing temporary lodging, that offers meeting hall or 
ballroom space for rent could be considered roughly equivalent assembly for 
purposes of the statute. See id. 
312 Id. 
313 See id.  
314 Id. 
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teacher and are engaged in a common activity with the common 
goal of education in a particular field.  Second, in the case of the 
catering hall, the persons gathering there generally do so in the 
context of celebrations such as wedding receptions—often 
following a religious wedding—where all invitees share a definite 
group affinity and identity in relation to the celebration.  Thus, 
on these facts, the court would likely hold for Reverend Gantry 
and against Rusty Wrench. 
This interpretation has the added benefits of avoiding the 
potential constitutional issue outlined above, effecting 
congressional intent, and remaining true to the text and 
structure of the statute as a whole.  Returning to the restaurant 
example discussed in Part III.A, the private right enjoyed there 
by the religious organization challenging the zoning ordinance 
allowing only restaurants in the zone would no longer exist.  
Rather than simply looking for one-to-one equality of all possible 
non-religious assemblies versus all religious assemblies, the 
inquiry would be focused upon the allowed and allowable land 
uses and their “primary purposes.”  In such a case, the relevant 
inquiry would be determining what the primary purpose of a 
restaurant is, and whether that purpose is similar to that of a 
church.  Clearly, in such a case the “equal terms” provision would 
not be violated.  The primary purpose of people assembling at a 
restaurant is to have a meal—the patrons do not identify with 
the restaurant or each other to any great or lasting degree.  A 
church, as noted above, implicates much more: it implies a group 
identity for those assembling and they assemble precisely for the 
purpose of acting as a group in a common activity—religious 
worship.  Therefore, the absurd result creating a “constitutional 
anomaly” noted earlier is addressed. 
Likewise, Congress’ intent to provide religious organizations 
a new tool with which to combat impermissible discrimination in 
land use regulations would be fulfilled.315  The religious plaintiff 
would be able to assert a claim with a reasonable chance of 
success provided the organization could identify an assembly or 
institution with a similar purpose allowed or allowable in the 
 
315 See 146 CONG. REC. S7776 (daily ed. July 27, 2000) (joint statement of Sen. 
Hatch and Sen. Kennedy). 
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zone.316  Examples of such similarly purposed assemblies would 
be those pursuing charitable or educational ends,317 essentially 
running the gamut of non-profit and tax exempt uses.  However, 
the potential universe of similarly purposed assemblies would 
not be restricted to those two areas.  Rather, the inquiry would 
be open to a case-by-case analysis of all the land uses allowed by 
the statute implicated.  The open ended nature of the inquiry 
would allow nearly any religious plaintiff with a reasonable claim 
to survive a summary judgment motion.  Furthermore, as cases 
are decided, the boundaries of the inquiry would become clearer 
and more reliable, providing guidance to both zoning boards and 
religious organizations, ultimately reducing discriminatory land 
use regulations and the associated legal battles. 
Finally, this interpretation hews closely to the text and fits 
neatly within the overall statutory scheme unlike the current 
circuit approaches.  The inquiry looks to the plain meaning of the 
words of the statute and gives them a meaning consonant with 
the underlying congressional intent and terms of the statute as a 
whole.  Were one to adopt the Eleventh Circuit’s test, the “equal 
terms” provision would be so powerful as to render subsections 
(b)(2) and (3) superfluous, and to render section (a) significantly 
less vital.318  Likewise, if one were to adopt either the Third or 
Seventh Circuit’s test, the “equal terms” provision would be 
rendered largely inoperative.319 
This proposed test, by contrast, appropriately mimics the 
Court’s Lukumi analysis by invalidating laws that, though 
outwardly generally applicable, are either by their terms or 
 
316 Parenthetically, it should be noted that the “equal terms” provision does not 
confer immunity from zoning regulations. See id. at S7777. Indeed, were a 
“megachurch” to attempt to use the “equal terms” provision to get ancillary uses 
permitted—such as a bowling alley or a McDonald’s—under the umbrella of allowing 
the basic religious land use of a church, the “equal terms” should not provide a 
means to circumvent an otherwise valid land use ordinance except in extremely rare 
circumstances. See HAMILTON, supra note 14, at 80 (noting the recent phenomenon 
of the “megachurch” resembling “self-contained communities”). In such a 
circumstance, the analysis would run into serious problems in the first leg of the 
analysis as it would be difficult, if not impossible, to determine the “primary 
purpose” of the religious land use for comparison against that of secular assemblies. 
317 After all, religious organizations do teach their followers the tenets of their 
religion, and commonly operate Sunday schools and the like as an adjunct to regular 
religious services. 
318 See supra notes 257–72 and accompanying text; see also supra Part III.B. 
319 See River of Life, 611 F.3d at 387; see also supra Part III.B. 
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effects discriminatory.  With the “equal terms” as an objective 
inquiry as to the terms and effects of the statute in question, the 
province of (b)(2), dealing with either express or implied 
discrimination “on the basis of religion,” would be left unaffected.  
Thus, a religious organization would be able to challenge a land 
use ordinance that, though generally applicable by design, was 
enacted with an improper motive under (b)(2).  Likewise, (b)(3) 
would remain operable to prevent total exclusion from a 
jurisdiction as the other subsections of (b) would not be so 
powerful and far reaching to render such an exclusion 
impossible.  Finally, section (a) would remain operable to handle 
situations involving laws that are not generally applicable and 
make use of individualized assessments.  Thus, each provision 
would have a proper and distinct role to play with relatively little 
overlap between each. 
CONCLUSION 
The Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 
2000 (“RLUIPA”), the latest chapter in the battle between 
Congress and the Court over the proper application of the Free 
Exercise clause, seeks to prevent religious discrimination as 
identified by Congress in an extensive record.  By its simple 
terms, the equal terms provision was well drafted to accomplish 
just such a result.  However, its simplicity of construction is such 
that it has created tremendous problems of interpretation, and, 
indeed, has lent itself to interpretations with a high probability 
of being unconstitutional.  But RLUIPA, and the equal terms 
provision in particular, need not suffer the same fate as RFRA or 
be rendered toothless.  In Midrash, Lighthouse, and River of Life 
each circuit was cognizant of the danger and, in the cases of the 
Third and Seventh Circuit, took affirmative measures to avoid 
the danger, albeit by contravening Congress’ intent.  However, by 
reference to the common purposes of the assemblies compared, a 
reasonable middle ground is found that accomplishes Congress’ 
intent and does so in a fashion that does not offend the 
Constitution. 
Unfortunately, this sensible middle ground is not the law in 
any jurisdiction.  Rather, at present, there exist three separate 
and distinct interpretations, each with myriad defects.  The 
situation demands addressing by either Congress or the Supreme 
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Court to lay out, once and for all, the appropriate interpretation 
for courts to apply.  Again, given the recent economic downturn, 
the need for such a settled interpretation has become more 
pressing.  As municipalities struggle for ways to boost sagging 
tax revenues, they will engage in new and creative land use 
legislation that favors tax generating land uses over tax-exempt 
religious land uses such as churches.  Thus, without a correct 
interpretation for zoning boards and religious organizations to 
rely upon, RLUIPA’s grand purpose to prevent religious 
discrimination will be frustrated more often, and more seriously, 
as time goes on. 
